The essay discusses two different conceptions of human dignity. According to the first conception, >respecting the dignity of a human being< means to respect something specific that is given by her being human. According to the second conception, however, >respecting the dignity of a human being< means to respect her as a human being. With regard to the first understanding, one is bound to respect human dignity (as an abstract concept), whereas on the basis of the second conception, we owe respect to the human being herself. The duty to respect human dignity serves as a foundation for duties we have with regard to human beings as such. The duty to respect someone as the human being she is, however, is a duty towards her. This duty therefore justifies a right she may claim, namely the right to be respected as a human being. The core of human dignity, then, is this rights-conferring status of being human. This article reacts to the German debate on human embryonic research. Participants in this debate argue that human dignity depends on being human in a generic sense. According to them, the early embryo participates in this sense of being human, which allows them to apply the concept of human dignity, including the absolute protection it entails, to human embryos. The author criticizes this view, claiming that it undermines the very idea of human dignity by neglecting the rights-conferring status of being a particular human being which is at its core. Rather, a "decent society" (Avishai Margalit) is characterized by the fact that its members are treated and respected an (individual) rights-holders.

Enthalten in:
Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik; 2007/1 Kommentare, Studien, Berichte, Dokumentationen, Diskussionen, Rezensionen, Bibliographie (2007)

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Serie / Reihe: Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik

Personen: Fischer, Johannes

Schlagwörter: Begriffsdefinition Anerkennung Menschenwürde