What role does intuition play in making moral judgements? This question is becoming of key importance in the current debate on fundamentals in applied ethies. The difficulties begin in defining what intuitions exactly are. Another important question revolves around the role of intuitions in rational argument. The main proposition of this essay is that intuitions are not the same as judgements or convictions, although they are often regarded as equivalent, and that intuition is always involved in every attempt at moral reflection and argument.

Enthalten in:
Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik; 2000/4 Kommentare, Studien, Berichte, Dokumentationen, Diskussionen, Rezensionen, Bibliographie (2000)

---

Serie / Reihe: Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik

Personen: Fischer, Johannes

Schlagwörter: Moral Sozialethik Wahrnehmung Urteilsbildung Moralphilosophie Urteilsfähigkeit Intuition